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Abstract
Theory suggests that large firms are more likely to engage in lobbying behaviour and
have better bargaining positions against their host governments than smaller entities.
Conditional on jurisdiction size, public policy choices are thus predicted to depend on
the shape of a jurisdiction’s firm size distribution, with more business-friendly poli-
cies being enacted if economic activity is concentrated in a small number of entities.
We empirically assess this prediction studying local business tax choices of German
municipalities. Exploiting rich and quasi-experimental variation in localities’ firm size
structures, we find evidence for an inverse relationship between the concentration of
economic activity and communities’ business tax choices. The effect is statistically
significant and quantitatively relevant, suggesting that the rising importance of large
businesses may trigger shifts towards a more business-friendly design of (tax) policies.
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1 Introduction
The importance of large corporations has steadily grown over recent decades (e.g.
Pyror (2001), UNCTAD (2002), Cefis et al. (2009), Poschke (2014)). Many observers
eye this development with scepticism and have raised concerns that the increasing
fraction of economic activity concentrated in big businesses may foster the corporate
sector’s influence over government policies (e.g. Business Week (2000), Roach (2007),
Crouch (2009), Forbes (2011), The Guardian (2014)). The purpose of our paper is
to empirically assess the importance of these concerns. Using corporate tax policy as
a testing ground, we investigate whether a jurisdiction’s firm size structure (labelled
’firm concentration’ hereafter) determines its government’s business tax rate choice.
The paper starts out with a brief discussion of theories that link governments’ (tax)
policy choices to jurisdictions’ firm size distributions.1 Conditional on jurisdiction
size, rising economic concentration at the firm level may first and foremost increase
aggregate corporate lobby spending as free-riding incentives are reduced2 and more
firms take the size threshold to participate in lobbying in the presence of fixed costs.
With high levels of firm concentration, jurisdictions on top become more dependent
on large employers within their borders, whose relocation would impose a shock on
local labor markets and jurisdictional welfare, consequently also raising the corporate
sector’s influence over government policies.
In the main part of the paper, we empirically test this hypothesis. Our analysis
relies on data for the German local business tax, which is set autonomously by German
municipalities. The setting is unique and ideal to assess the question of interest. Firstly,
tax issues belong to the most pressing policy concerns of the corporate sector (see e.g.
the lobbying statistics of the US NGO Open Secrets). Secondly, using subnational
data offers the advantage that our sample localities, while autonomously choosing the
local business tax rate, operate in an otherwise homogenous institutional setting. The
business tax furthermore significantly contributes to the tax burden on corporations
in Germany, making up around 40% of corporate tax payments on average. The
focus on policy choices of subnational government tiers finally allows us to construct
consistent measures for the firm size structure of our sample localities exploiting rich
administrative micro-data for Germany.3
1Note that we focus on jurisdictions’ firm size structures, as opposed to firm size distributions
within industries or spatial firm concentration.
2Decentralized corporate lobbying for business-friendly common government policies exerts a pos-
itive externality on other firms in the jurisdiction which is not internalized by the individual firm.
3Consistent data on the firm size structure of countries is to the best of our knowledge not available.
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We pursue two empirical strategies to assess the link between firm concentration
and local business tax choices. The first exploits rich cross-sectional and longitudinal
variation in firm concentration across a large number of German localities. Estimating
static and dynamic models that absorb observed and unobserved differences between
municipalities and host regions, we indeed find that higher levels of firm concentration
are associated with significantly smaller local business tax choices. Quantitatively, an
increase in the Herfindahl index by 0.1 (corresponding to about one standard deviation)
is estimated to lower municipalities’ local business taxes by 1.3% on average. The
magnitude of the effect moreover significantly increases with locality size and with
right-wing majorities in the local council. These results are robust to various robustness
checks, among others to dynamic model specifications where firm concentration is
instrumented with its 5-year lag. This hedges against reverse causality concerns since
localities cannot credibly commit on business tax growth five years in the future (to
change their firm size distribution today), given that 5-year intervals include elections
that may change the composition of local councils.
The second empirical identification strategy relies on exogenous variation in firm con-
centration induced by community amalgamations during a major municipality bound-
ary reform in the German state of Sachsen-Anhalt, which reduced the number of mu-
nicipalities from around 1000 to around 200. While municipalities were initially free
to choose partners, the state legislature forced 115 municipalities to amalgamate with
predetermined partners in a later phase of the reform. The induced changes in juris-
dictions’ firm size structure are exploited for empirical identification. Conditional on
jurisdiction size, socio-economic and budgetary components, the results again point
to an inverse relationship between firm concentration and local business tax choices.
Similar to the findings in the first part of the analysis, a 0.1-increase in the Herfindahl
index is estimated to lower municipalities’ local business tax choices by 1.6% on aver-
age. This finding moreover prevails in instrumental variable models, where empirical
identification relies on predicted rather than actual forced amalgamations.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to establish a link between
jurisdictions’ firm size distributions and corporate tax policy choices. The paper con-
tributes to a flourishing literature on the determinants of tax setting behaviour. In re-
cent years, studies mainly focused on strategic interaction in corporate tax rate choices
of neighbouring jurisdictions, presenting evidence in favour of inter-jurisdictional tax
competition and a race-to-the-bottom of corporate tax rates (see e.g. Devereux et al.
(2008), Overesch and Rinke (2011)). A recent strand of the literature qualifies this
race-to-the-bottom prediction by showing that corporate tax competition is mitigated
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by agglomeration rents and that larger jurisdictions choose higher corporate tax rates
(see e.g. Ludema and Wooton (2000), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Jofre-Monseny
and Sole-Olle (2012), Koh et al. (2013), Bru¨lhardt et al. (2013), Luthi and Schmid-
heiny (2014)). Our paper adds to this literature by highlighting that, beyond effects
related to the aggregated size of a jurisdiction’s corporate activity, intra-jurisdictional
firm size heterogeneity also impacts on governments’ corporate tax rate choices.
As firm concentration varies significantly across countries and sub-national govern-
ment tiers (see e.g. Garcia-Santana and Ramos (2012)), our findings help to explain
observed differences in governments’ corporate tax policy choices. The results more-
over suggest that recent decades’ merger and acquisition waves and the trend towards
more concentration of economic activity (particularly in emerging markets and the
developing world, see e.g. Poschke (2014)) affect governments’ tax policy choices and
may trigger shifts towards more favourable tax conditions for the corporate sector.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we present theoret-
ical considerations to motivate our empirical analysis. Section 3 provides institutional
background on the German local business tax. Sections 4 and 5 present our data, the
empirical identification strategy and estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
While the economic literature provides comprehensive evidence that the aggregate size
of economic activity affects jurisdictions’ corporate tax rate choices, it largely ignores
the possibility that firm size heterogeneity drives governmental tax setting behaviour.
As sketched in the Introduction, empirically testing for the latter relationship is the
core aim of our paper. A theoretical link between jurisdictions’ firm size structures and
corporate (tax) policy may be established through two mechanisms.
The first relates to corporate lobbying activities and thus to the direct attempt of the
corporate sector to influence government policy. The effect of lobbying on government
behaviour has been analysed extensively in the economic literature (see e.g. Olsen
(1965) and Grossman and Helpman (2001)) and growing empirical evidence confirms
the effectiveness of lobbying activities in influencing policy choices (see, among others,
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for trade protection, Facchini et al. (2011) for immigration
policy, Blau et al. (2013) for bank bailouts and Salamon and Siegfried (1977) and
Richter et al. (2009) for tax policy choices).
While most papers link aggregate lobby spending to the size of interest groups,
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Bombardini (2008) emphasizes the role of firm heterogeneity in driving lobby formation
and aggregate lobby spending. In particular, she argues that in the presence of a fixed
cost of making political contributions, i.e. initial expenses necessary to play an active
role in lobbying activities, only the largest firms participate in lobby formation since
the initial fixed costs of organizing for political activity may be spread over a larger
asset base. It follows that, conditional on the aggregate size of the jurisdiction4, lobby
spending becomes larger if the firm size distribution is skewed and economic activity
is concentrated in relatively large entities.
An analogous prediction derives from the observation that firms benefit from favor-
able common business policies enforced by the lobbying of other corporates. Lobby
involvement is thus affected by free-riding incentives (e.g. Olsen (1965)), making ag-
gregate lobby spending inefficiently small from the perspective of the corporate sector.
If a jurisdiction’s economic activity becomes more concentrated, the positive lobbying
externality on other firms is partly internalized, lowering the free-rider problem and
enhancing overall corporate lobbying and hence influence over government policy.
In a world in which firms are mobile across borders, a jurisdiction’s firm size structure
may moreover also indirectly impact on governments’ tax policy choices.5 To see this,
consider a scenario where corporate location decisions are a function of governments’
policy choices and idiosyncratic location preferences. If firms obtain shocks to their
location preferences each period, communities may lose and win firms that relocate
across borders. In such a setting, welfare costs of firm turnover are plausibly higher
if communities lose relatively large entities as the lost economic activity and jobs may
not be compensated in the short run by the attraction or foundation of new firms,
causing unemployment and related welfare losses. Even if communities can make up
for the lost economic activity, search frictions in the labor market may induce significant
welfare losses (in the short-run) when large employers relocate. If communities (e.g. for
historic reasons) depend on large firms, they may hence be more inclined to implement
4Contrary to lobbying for private or industry-specific public policies, we are interested in lobbying
for policies that affect all firms located in a jurisdiction. Note that, if given the choice, firms would
prefer to lobby for private benefits (instead of favourable common policies at the industry or jurisdic-
tion level), as this avoids free rider problems (see next paragraph of the main text) and may provide
advantages over competitors. Governments, however, can hardly differentiate policy design at the
firm or industry level due to administrative and legal constraints (the European non-discrimination
law e.g. prohibits state aid for specific firms (Articles 101 and 107, Treaty on the Functioning of the
EU)), hence creating a role for aggregate corporate sector lobbying.
5See Han and Leach (2008) for a theoretical model on corporate tax rate choices if firms and
communities bargain over corporate tax rates.
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business-friendly policies to avoid relocations.6
In the following, we will empirically assess the proposed link between firm concen-
tration and government policies using the German local business tax as testing ground.
3 Institutional Background
The local business tax in Germany (’Gewerbesteuer’) is set autonomously by around
12,000 German localities. The definition of the tax base is determined by federal
law and is thus homogenous across municipalities. The business tax rate is levied on
business earnings of all incorporated and non-incorporated firms located within the
communities’ borders and follows the corporate and income tax law. It represents
the most important revenue instrument at the communities’ own discretion (see e.g.
Bu¨ttner (2003) for further legal background).7 There is no upper bound for the tax
rate, but a lower bound was introduced in 2004. The majority of the local business tax
revenues remains directly with the municipalities. A small share has to be transferred to
the central and regional level though, as an element of the German federal equalization
scheme (see also Foremny and Riedel (2014)).
The local business tax significantly contributes to the tax burden on corporations in
Germany. From 2000 to 2007 (which defines our sample frame in the first part of the
empirical analysis), the average tax rate set by West German communities was 16.9%,
varying between 10% and 25% (cf. Table 1).8
Recent decades were furthermore characterized by an upward trend in local business
tax rates. Between 2000 and 2007, around 60% of the West German communities raised
6Moreover, if profitability rates increase with firm size, so does the tax-sensitivity of corporate
investments (Baldwin and Okube (2009)). Like the mechanisms discussed in the text, this predicts
an inverse relationship between firm concentration and corporate tax choices.
7A major fraction of communities’ revenues comes from state grants and redistributed tax revenues.
German communities moreover autonomously set the local property tax rate. The business tax is the
more important revenue source though, collecting around 70% of municipalities’ own tax revenues.
8Note that the tax rate legislation defines the local business tax in business tax points, not per-
centage points (average for West Germany between 2000 and 2007: 338 tax points). To arrive at
the local business tax rate in percentage points, the tax points have to be multiplied by a base rate.
Until 2007, a proportional base rate of 5% applied for corporations (and for non-incorporated firms on
income above EUR 48,000 (Par. 11 Local Business Tax Act)). To ease interpretation, the empirical
analysis to come will approximate the local business tax rate in percentage points, calculated as the
product of the community’s local business tax in business tax points and the base rate of 5%. Note
that the results are also robust to using an effective local business tax measure, which additionally
takes into account that the local business tax was deductible from its own base until 2007.
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their local business tax rate at least once, while only around 6% of the communities
enacted a tax decline at least once. This pattern may on the one hand reflect increased
funding needs of local municipalities as rising social costs and reforms which shifted
additional obligations to the local level put pressure on community finances. Exam-
ples are the law for the provision of additional kindergarten capacities by the local
level (‘Gesetz zum Ausbau der Kindergartenbetreuung’) and additional social security
payments for the elderly and the unemployed (see e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank (2002,
2007)). On the other hand, in 2001 and 2008 the German federal government enacted a
decline in the headline federal corporate tax rate (”Ko¨rperschaftssteuer”), which might
- in a vertical tax competition framework - increase the communities’ incentive to raise
their local business tax rate.
Finally, note that municipalities in Germany operate in a homogenous institutional
environment. First and foremost, they have exactly the same fiscal policy tools at
hand. In all communities, a change in the local business tax rate is furthermore en-
acted by a simple majority of votes in the local council. Localities also face the same
main responsibilities, including the construction and maintenance of roads, sewerage,
kindergartens and primary schools as well as the provision of certain social benefits
to the unemployed and the poor. Other responsibilities, such as the maintenance of
cultural or sport facilities, tourism, and public transport are optional.
4 Baseline Approach
The baseline analysis studies the link between local business tax choices and firm
concentration in West German localities between 2000 and 2007.9
4.1 Data
Data for the German local business tax is linked to measures for the firm size structure
of our sample jurisdictions calculated from the universe of German plants provided
9The sample restriction to West German localities and to the years 2000-2007 is data-driven and
reflects that the plant data provided by the German Employment Agency (see below), which we use
to calculate the firm concentration indices, is available to us for the indicated time period only. East
German localities are moreover omitted from this part of the analysis as East Germany saw major
community boundary reforms within our sample frame. In the second part of our empirical analysis,
we set up an empirical model where identification relies on a subset of amalgamations that were
exogenously imposed upon communities in the East German state of Sachsen-Anhalt.
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by the German Employment Agency (GEA) for 2000 to 2007. The data comprises
more than 2 million plants per year and includes information on the host community
and the number of employees subject to social security contributions (see also Koh
and Riedel (2014)).10 In the following, we will make use of a Herfindahl index Hit
constructed from this data in previous research, which captures the firm concentration
of jurisdiction i’s economic activity in year t: Hit =
∑
k (EMPikt/
∑
k EMPikt)
2, with
EMPik denoting the employment of plant k located in community i at time t and
0 ≤ Hit ≤ 1 (see Koh and Riedel (2014) for further details). In robustness checks, we
will assess the sensitivity of our empirical results to the use of alternative concentration
measures, namely the standard deviation of the jurisdiction’s firm size distribution and
the employment share of the largest firm (see Section 4.3 and the online appendix).
In the empirical analysis, we disregard small communities that host less than 10
plants since firm concentration is large by construction for these localities (as will be
shown, the results are not sensitive to this sample restriction though). Our main sample
comprises 6174 municipalities and 45,394 municipality-year-observations.11
The data is moreover augmented by rich information on the socio-economic, bud-
getary and political characteristics of our sample municipalities. We account for the
size of economic activity as measured by the community’s number of employees and
economic conditions as measured by the localities’ unemployment rate and the net
income per capita. We furthermore add information on the level of public good provi-
sion, precisely on the municipality’s number of railway stations, airports, seaports and
high-way connections. We moreover include information on public good preferences
and financing needs as indicated by the fraction of the community’s population aged
below 15 and above 65 as well as indicators for the municipalities’ fiscal performance,
namely public borrowing defined as the share of revenues that is generated by new
credits, less amortization of debts, total outstanding debt in per capita terms12 and
grants per capita received from higher government tiers. Finally, we include informa-
tion on the seat shares of the political parties in the municipal council. Table 1 presents
information on variable definition, data sources and descriptive statistics.
Finally, we augment the analysis by firm-level data in Bureau van Dijk’s DAFNE
database (wave July 2012), which comprises rich information on firms in Germany.
10Plants with a least one employee subject to social security contributions are included in the data.
11Note that our West German sample localities were not subject to community boundary reforms.
12All community controls vary at the municipality level with the exception of income per capita
and debt per capita, which are obtained at the county level. The latter variable, however, also
includes municipality-specific information on the debt of hospitals and other city owned companies
like transportation or sewage.
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Main source for the data is the registrar of companies in Germany. From 2006 onwards,
the data covers nearly all companies with limited liability in Germany.13 Due to poor
firm coverage, we discard data prior to 2006. DAFNE’s firm-level data is linked to
our sample localities via post code information. In the following, the data is used
to control for the industry affiliation and legal form of firms located in our sample
jurisdictions and will, complementary to the GEA data, be employed to construct the
firm concentration measures.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of firm concentration Hi,r,t in municipality i of region r at time t
on its local business tax choice bi,r,t, we estimate a model of the following form
bi,r,t = α1bi,r,t−1 + α2Hi,r,t + α′3Xi,r,t + ρt + µr + ui,r,t. (1)
The theoretical considerations suggest that a higher concentration of firm activity is
associated with lower local business tax choices and hence α2 < 0.
The estimation approach controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across
municipalities and host regions. In particular, we include control variables for the size of
the community’s aggregate economic activity (log of the number of employees) and the
other socio-economic, budgetary and political characteristics described in the previous
section (subsumed in the vector Xi,r,t). In robustness checks, we also augment the set
of regressors by control variables for the industry structure of firms and corporate rents
from spatial firm concentration.
A full set of year fixed effects ρt furthermore captures common shocks to all sample
municipalities over time. Unobserved heterogeneity across hosting regions is absorbed
by including regional fixed effects µr for the German states, counties and commuting
areas (“Raumordnungsregionen”, see Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordung) re-
spectively. We furthermore run robustness checks that account for region-year fixed
effects, municipality fixed effects and clustering of errors at different aggregation levels.
Further sensitivity analyses assess the robustness of our results to dynamic model
specifications14 and instrumental variables (IV) regressions where the firm size struc-
ture Hi,r,t is instrumented with its five-year lag and with the average age of all firms
13In 2007 for example, more than 90% of all firms with a limited liability that are subject to the
local business tax in Germany are included in the database.
14The respective models account for commuting area fixed effects. Since the number of municipality-
year cells per commuting area is large, Nickell bias is negligible in this context.
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hosted in a locality (calculated from DAFNE) to address potential reverse causality
concerns.15 In the dynamic IV specifications, the coefficient α2 is consistently estimated
if, conditional on the set of regressors, the firm size distribution in period t− 5 is un-
affected by the evolution in the local business tax in period t. For this to be violated,
business tax changes, firstly, had to trigger heterogenous investment responses across
small and large firms and communities must, secondly, be able to credibly commit on
a future local business tax growth path, e.g. attract (large) firms today by promising
a moderate local business tax growth path five years in the future. As five-year lags
imply that there are local council elections in between, which may change political
parties and coalitions in power, such commitments are hardly possible.
As will be shown below, the results are insensitive to the inclusion of different sets of
control variables. On top, we run specifications which account for potential endogeneity
of control variables. Most importantly, we treat the jurisdiction’s aggregate size as
endogenous as it may correlate with the locality’s firm size distribution and may be
directly determined by local business tax choices (see e.g. DeMooij and Ederveen (2003)
and Devereux (2007)). Specifically, we follow previous work by Koh et al. (2013)
and use long-lagged information from a population census in 1910 and long-lagged
information on the number of train connections through our sample municipalities
between 1835 and 193516 to construct two instruments for today’s community size: the
logarithm of the population density of our sample localities in 1910 and the logarithm
of the number of train connections through the localities prior to 1935.
4.3 Results
The baseline results are reported in Table 2. The observational unit is the German
municipality. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors that account for clustering at
the municipality level are depicted in brackets below the coefficient estimates. Spec-
ification (1) regresses the local business tax rate on the Herfindahl index and a full
15The idea of the latter instrument relates to the observed positive correlation between firm age
and firm size (see e.g. Situm (2014)). Also note that DAFNE does not cover the universe of German
firms, especially small non-incorporated firms may be missing. This adds noise to the data and hence
is expected to reduce the relevance of the instrumental variable.
16The data is obtained from ”Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1915), Die Volksza¨hlung im
Deutschen Reiche am 1. Dezember 1910, Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Berlin” and ”Handbuch
der deutschen Eisenbahnstrecken (1984): Ero¨ffnungsdaten 1835-1935, Streckenla¨ngen, Konzessionen,
Eigentumsverha¨ltnisse, Dumjahn, Mainz” and is matched to the communities in our data set based
on historic maps (see Koh et al. (2013)).
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set of commuting area fixed effects, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and the socio-
economic, political and budgetary control variables described above. In line with our
theoretical considerations, the estimates point to a statistically significant inverse re-
lationship between the Herfindahl index and communities’ local business tax choice.
This finding prevails in the dynamic and instrumental variable models (cf. Columns
(2) and (3)) described above.17 Specification (4) moreover shows that the results are
robust to controlling for the legal form of firms hosted in the community and the overall
size of the communities’ local business tax base (the latter allows for the possibility
that the firm size structure impacts on the business tax base, which may then affect
optimal local business tax rate choices). Quantitatively, Specification (4) suggests that
an increase in the Herfindahl index by 0.1 (corresponding to about one standard devi-
ation) lowers the local business tax in the long run by 0.23 percentage points or 14.2%
of a standard deviation. Evaluated at the sample mean (=16.93%), this corresponds
to a drop in the local business tax by 1.3%.18
The analysis moreover tests for potential heterogeneity in effect size as anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that smaller German communities have limited room for strategic policy
choices. Specifically, it is mostly larger municipalities which, besides their mandatory
spending obligations, provide significant amounts of public goods and services (e.g.
recreational and cultural facilities or infrastructure) - reflecting prohibitively high per
capita provision costs in smaller jurisdictions (see e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (1997)).
17Since the Herfindahl index for the localities’ firm size structure is available from 1999 onwards only,
we restrict the sample to the years starting in 2004 to instrument the current Herfindahl index with
its 5-year lag. Note that reestimating Specifications (1) and (2) on the restricted sample beginning in
2004 yields qualitatively and quantitatively comparable results.
18The long-run effect is calculated from αˆ2×0.1/(1− αˆ1) = −0.0109/(1−0.952) = 0.23 (cf. Column
(4)). Information on the share of non-incorporated firms is drawn from the German local business
tax statistics and available at the county level (cf. Table 1). Similar results are obtained when we
calculate the share of non-incorporated firms at the locality level from DAFNE (= difference between
the total firm number in a given locality drawn from GEA and the number of incorporated firms from
DAFNE (as DAFNE includes essentially the full population of incorporated firms in Germany, while
the coverage of non-incorporated entities is rather poor)). The coefficient estimate for the fraction
of non-incorporated firms turns out positive, suggesting that communities exploit that local business
tax payments are credited against the personal income tax of owners of non-incorporated businesses.
Increased local business tax rates hence redistribute tax revenue from the federal personal income
tax to the local business tax while hardly raising the effective tax burden on income earned in non-
incorporated businesses. Furthermore note that information on the tax base of the local business
tax was obtained from the German federal statistical offices. The variable is instrumented with its
county-average in Specification (4).
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As localities, moreover, have limited options to take on debt19, small jurisdictions are
often reported to only adjust their local business tax rate to balance their mandatory
spending. Specifications (5) to (7) and (8) to (10) test for this notion and reestimate
the baseline model restricting the sample to communities that host at least 100 and
250 plants respectively. The results indeed point to larger effects in these subsamples.
Specifications (7) and (10) suggest that an increase in the Herfindahl index by 0.1
lowers the local business tax rate by 0.55 and 0.99 percentage points respectively or,
evaluated at the sample mean, by 3.2% and 5.4%.
Specification (11) furthermore reestimates the model in Column (10), restricting the
sample to communities where the conservative and liberal parties hold the majority
of seats in the local council (which is the legislative body that, with majority votes,
can enact changes in the community’s local business tax). The sample restriction
follows the presumption that right-wing parties may be more open to business lobbying
and business needs than their left-wing or civil party counterparts, implying a higher
sensitivity of local business tax choices to changes in firm concentration. In line with
this notion, we find larger effects than in the previous specifications. Precisely, a
0.1-increase in the Herfindahl index is found to lower the local business tax by 2.0
percentage points or 11.0% evaluated at the sample mean.
We moreover ran a large set of further robustness checks to assess whether the
baseline findings are sensitive to observed and unobserved heterogeneity across our
sample jurisdictions. The sensitivity analyses are presented in the online appendix
and yield findings comparable to our baseline estimates when commuting area-year
fixed effects, county fixed effects, municipality fixed effects as well as control variables
for the jurisdiction’s industry structure, industry agglomeration and the fraction of the
localities’ economic activity in multinational firms are included. The findings moreover
prevail in models that allow for a more flexible functional form of the control variables,
account for alternative definitions of the firm concentration measures and for clustering
of errors at different levels. The findings also remain qualitatively and quantitatively
unchanged in binary model specifications where upward and downward adjustments
in local business tax choices are regressed on firm concentration measures. Finally,
quantile regressions provide weak evidence that lower conditional quantiles of the local
business tax distribution react more sensitively to changes in the Herfindahl index than
upper conditional quantiles. See the online appendix for details.
Concluding, the findings point to an inverse relationship between firm concentration
19Municipality codes limit new borrowings to investment spending and the conversions of debt and
there are, moreover, mandatory assessments by supervisory authorities.
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and localities’ local business tax choice, which is insensitive to controlling for observed
and unobserved heterogeneity across host jurisdictions and regions. To corroborate
this evidence, we will, in the following, reassess the effect of firm concentration on local
business tax choices in a setting that allows us to exploit quasi-experimental variation
in firm concentration induced by a major community boundary reform in the German
state of Sachsen-Anhalt.
5 Identification from a Natural Experiment
Aiming for higher fiscal capacity of state localities (e.g. Grundlach (2013)), the bound-
ary reform significantly reduced the number of communities in Sachsen-Anhalt from
around 1000 to around 200 and, in doing so, significantly changed the firm size struc-
ture of communities. The reform was first outlined in a state-level coalition agreement
between the conservative party (CDU) and the social democrats (SPD) in April 2006.
Its principles and legal foundations were published in December 2006 and enacted into
state law in August 2007 and February 2008. The reform aimed to create localities
with more than 10,000 inhabitants (allowing for exceptions in lowly populated areas)
and was implemented in two phases: during the first phase of the reform (until June
2009), municipalities were free to choose partners, in the second phase (until January
2011) 115 amalgamations were legally enforced by the state authorities (through a legal
provision enacted in July 2010).20
Our empirical identification strategy builds on variation in localities’ firm size dis-
tribution induced by forced mergers during the second phase. Note that voluntary
mergers during the first reform phase are less suited to identify causal effects as prior
research suggests them to be driven by strategic policy choices of communities (Freier
et al. (2013) e.g. show that the partisan structures of local councils predict voluntary
merger propensities). Sachsen-Anhalt’s state administration moreover incentivised the
voluntary mergers with special grants. The forced mergers were, in turn, exogenously
imposed upon communities. At the end of the first reform phase in 2010, the state
administration identified 115 localities whose population fell short from the determined
minimum size and assigned them to merge with pre-determined partners.21 All merg-
20Several East German states implemented boundary reforms over recent decades. Other reforms,
however, triggered a smaller number of amalgamations. Moreover, with the exception of Brandenburg,
none of the other reforms included forced amalgamations.
21The state government first published a draft law that specified amalgamations to be implemented
during the second phase of the reform. In reaction to the draft law, a number of localities voluntarily
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ers were completed by January 2011. Note that the state legislature did not publish
explicit assignment rules but anecdotal evidence suggests that the state administra-
tion aimed to create localities of about equal size and merged adjacent localities with
close-by community cores to maximise synergy effects and minimise frictions related
to fragmented community areas. Figure 1 graphically depicts absorbing and target
communities in voluntary and forced mergers.
5.1 Data and Estimation Strategy
The empirical analysis relies on a data set that comprises the 218 localities in Sachsen-
Anhalt that emerged from the boundary reform. Most of these localities existed in
2006 already, but several had integrated other communities during the voluntary or
forced phase of the boundary reform. Some communities were completely unaffected
by the reform, others merged on equal footing to become a new locality. We create a
panel data set for these 218 localities from 2006 to 2014. Locality i’s firm concentration
is captured by a Herfindahl index HAit calculated from DAFNE for 2009 (which is the
year prior to the forced merger decisions).22 To capture changes in communities’ firm
size structure induced by the forced amalgamations, the Herfindahl index is extended
to the years 2006-2008 and 2010-2014 and modelled to vary over time with changes in
firm size structures brought about by the forced community amalgamations only. For
localities that merged on equal footing, we account for the firm size structure of the
larger of the two localities in the pre-reform years.
Methodologically, we estimate a difference-in-differences model where the develop-
ment of local business tax rates in communities that integrated other localities in the
course of forced amalgamations is compared with a control group of unaffected commu-
nities to filter out the common time trend. Figure 2 shows that the local business tax
in treatment and control group follow a parallel trend in the pre-reform years before
2010. The forced community amalgamations triggered diverse changes in the firm size
structure of affected localities. While firm concentration declined on average, some
communities observed stark decreases in their Herfindahl index, while others experi-
enced mild decreases or increases in firm concentration. Conditional on being treated,
amalgamated (these amalgamations are coded as voluntary in our empirical analysis). There were
moreover hearings of representatives of localities affected by forced mergers. However, there is only
one case, in which the absorbing community determined in the final law deviates from the absorbing
community in the draft law.
22Note that firm size is proxied by firms’ total assets since information on the number of employees
is poorly covered in DAFNE.
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the average change in the Herfindahl index is -0.1, varying between -0.37 and 0.2. We
hence estimate a variant of the difference-in-differences model that accounts for these
differences in treatment intensity, and regress the local business tax choice bit of com-
munity i at time t on the Herfindahl index HAit (that varies with forced community
amalgamations only, see above), conditioning on full sets of community and year fixed
effects (φi and ρt).
23 Formally, the model reads
bit = β0 + β1HAit + β2Rit + ρt + φi + it. (2)
As the boundary reform alters community characteristics in several dimensions, we
furthermore include time-varying community-characteristics in the vector Rit, most
importantly community size and socio-economic locality characteristics. We also con-
trol for the party composition of the local council24 and run robustness checks which
augment the model by control variables for communities’ per capita spending, grants
received and the size of the local business tax base.25 Finally, we augment the vec-
tor of regressors by the predicted local business tax rate, which corresponds to the
community’s local business tax rate in 2005 and varies only for those localities that
are affected by amalgamations. Specifically, for them, the variable corresponds to the
predicted local business tax rate of the amalgamated communities, calculated as the
population-weighted average of their 2005 local business tax rates in the after-reform
years. This absorbs unobserved heterogeneity in determinants of the local business tax
choice, e.g. related to underlying preferences of the population.
Finally note that analogously to the first part of the empirical analysis, we again
disregard localities which host less than 10 firms. Furthermore, some of the communi-
ties that merged (voluntarily or forced by the state administration) settled agreements
23Following our argumentation in the first part of the paper, we again define the local business tax
measure bit as the product of the local business tax rate in business tax points and the base rate
of 5% (cf. Footnote 8) to approximate the local business tax rate in percentage points and to ease
interpretation. Since the analysis focuses on the local business tax choices of localities, we moreover
refrain from calculating effective tax measures which take into account that the local business tax was
deductible from its own base until 2007 and that the base rate changed in 2008.
24Note that, contrary to voluntary mergers, partisan effects plausibly do not drive forced merger
decisions in our context though - especially given that Sachsen-Anhalt’s state level government was a
coalition between the conservative CDU and left-wing SPD at the time of the reform.
25Note that due to changes in community accounting provisions, information on the control variables
related to the localities’ budgetary accounting (grants received and spending per capita) are not
published by Statistical Offices for the later sample years. The construction of the corresponding
control variables hence follows the construction of the Herfindahl index, starting with their 2005 values
and then capturing variation - based on the 2005 values - brought about by community amalgamations.
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determining that their prevailing local business tax rates were sustained in the old com-
munity area for one or several post-reform years. The corresponding community-year
observations are dropped from the analysis.
5.2 Results
The results are presented in Table 4. In Specification (1), we regress the communities’
local business tax rate on the Herfindahl index described above, which captures varia-
tion in firm concentration induced by forced community amalgamations in the second
phase of the reform. Controlling for a full set of municipality fixed effects and year fixed
effects, the model yields a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate for
the Herfindahl index, as expected. This result prevails when the model is augmented
by the socio-economic, political and budgetary control variables described above (cf.
Specification (2)). Quantitatively, Specification (2) suggests that an increase in the
Herfindahl index by 0.1 (corresponding to an increase by about half of a standard
deviation) reduces the local business tax rate by 1.7% on average.26
Specification (3) moreover adds control variables that indicate whether localities
absorbed other communities in voluntary and forced mergers during the reform up
to year t and a control variable for the number of absorbed communities up to year
t, hence allowing for the possibility that voluntary and forced amalgamations exert
unobserved effects on local business tax choices. Identification in these specifications
thus relies on differences in the treatment intensity of communities subject to forced
mergers. This yields results that are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to
the previous specifications. Specification (4) furthermore shows that the results are
robust to augmenting the set of regressors by the community’s local business tax base.
In Specification (5), we present evidence that these results prevail in an instrumental
variable model where variation in the Herfindahl index induced by both, voluntary and
forced mergers, is instrumented with variation related to forced amalgamations only.
Finally, Specification (6) addresses concerns about potential systematic assignment
of target localities to neighboring municipalities based on characteristics that corre-
late with firm size structures and future local business tax choices. While we do not
consider such a correlation likely, we define an instrumental variable which captures
variation in the Herfindahl index induced by predicted (rather than actual) assign-
26Note that we lose 4 observations when including the control variables due to missing values.
Rerunning Specification (1) on the sample of Specification (2) yields qualitatively and quantitatively
unchanged results though.
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ments of target communities, following anecdotes that the state administration aimed
to create localities of about equal size and amalgamated communities with close-by
centroids (to avoid fragmented community areas).
The construction of the instrumental variable consequently assigns sparsely popu-
lated target municipalities (where the relative population gain of the smallest adjacent
neighbour would be small in case of assignment) to the nearest neighbouring munic-
ipality in the same county as measured by the distance between the two centroids.
Large target municipalities (where the relative population gain for the smallest neigh-
bour is high) are, in turn, assigned to the least populated municipality among the five
nearest neighbors in the same county.27 In Specification (6), we instrument variation
in the Herfindahl index reflecting actual changes in the firm size distribution related
to community amalgamations with predicted changes based on these assignment rules.
In doing so, sparsely populated targets are defined as communities whose population is
less than 5% of any of its neighbouring localities’ population; the results are, however,
not sensitive to the choice of particular cutoff values for this definition. The estimates
confirm the negative effect of firm concentration on local business tax choices. Quan-
titatively, Specification (6) suggests that an increase in the Herfindahl index by 0.1
lowers the local business tax rate by 2.0%. While the effect is thus somewhat larger
when identification relies on predicted rather than actual amalgamations, the differ-
ence is not statistically significant as standard errors increase as well. Note also that
the first stage F-test confirms the relevance of the instrument. Overall, the results
are consistent across the two different empirical strategies. The second approach yields
point estimates that are slightly larger in magnitude, but so is the size of the (emerging)
communities in Sachsen-Anhalt compared to the average community in West Germany.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The paper presents evidence for a systematic link between jurisdictions’ firm size dis-
tribution and government policies. Using the German local business tax as a testing
27When determining the five nearest neighboring municipalities, we take all voluntary mergers as
given and exclude municipalities that are themselves a target during the second reform phase. Note
moreover that we assign localities to one of their five nearest neighbors (measured by the distance
between locality centroids) as more than 80% of the target communities have been assigned to one
of the five nearest neighbors. Increasing the number of potential partners would obviously raise this
fraction but would come at the cost that more of the potential partners would not share a common
border with the target community (leading to a lower overlap of predicted and actual assignments).
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ground, we find that higher levels of firm concentration in German communities are
associated with lower local business tax choices. The effect turns out statistically sig-
nificant and quantitatively relevant and prevails in various sensitivity checks, including
empirical models that draw on exogenous variation in jurisdictions’ firm size distribu-
tion induced by a major boundary reform in the German state of Sachsen-Anhalt.
The results confirm prior descriptive and anecdotal evidence, e.g. suggesting that
the German cities of Wolfsburg, Ingolstadt and Ludwigshafen, which host the head-
quarters of leading car and chemical manufacturers Volkswagen, Audi and BASF, set
considerably lower local business taxes than otherwise comparable jurisdictions with a
more even firm size distribution.28
Several implications follow from the analysis. Firstly, the findings suggest that dif-
ferences in firm concentration across jurisdictions add to explaining observed hetero-
geneity in governments’ (corporate tax) policy choices. Secondly, it follows that recent
decades’ merger and acquisition waves and the trend towards more concentration of
economic activity (especially in emerging markets and the developing world) may not be
neutral in terms of governments’ (tax) policy choices and may lead to more favourable
(tax) conditions for the corporate sector. Thirdly, the findings feed into debates about
the assignment of taxing rights and spending responsibilities across government tiers.29
28Local employment of Audi and BASF (Volkswagen) amounts to around one third (one half) of
overall city employment. Ludwigshafen and Wolfsburg charged local business tax rates of 360 business
tax points, Ingolstadt of 400 business tax points in 2007, which fall short from the average rate of
other German cities of comparable size (around 420 business tax points, see also Footnote 8). The
low rate in Ludwigshafen partly relates to BASF pressing the city to lower its business tax rate in
2002 by threatening to relocate production (Neue Lu (2002)).
29As firm concentration, on average, declines at higher aggregation levels, the results in our paper
predict corporate sector influence on government policy to be higher with lower government tiers;
there may, however also be countervailing effects, e.g. related to higher government tiers having more
policy instruments at hand to accommodate the corporate sector.
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Figure 1: Mergers of Municipalities in Sachsen Anhalt 2006-2014
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8 Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Baseline Analysis (Section 4)
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Local Business Tax
Local Business Tax (Perc. Points) 45,394 16.859 1.585 10 25
Herfindahl Index, Firm Concentration 45,394 .103 .107 .002 .863
Socio-Economic Characteristics
Number of Employees 45,394 3482.822 17,793.51 12 695,650
Population Share Aged > 65 45,394 .176 .032 0 .415
Population Share Aged < 15 45,394 .167 .023 0 .279
Unemployment Rate 45,394 .030 .012 0 .118
Income pC? 45,394 17.546 1.793 13.222 28.872
Rural Community 45,394 .756 .429 0 1
Share Non-Incorporated Firms 21,288 .732 .081 .231 1
Party Seat Shares Local Council
Share Conservative Party (CDU/CSU) 45,394 .309 .224 0 1
Share Social Democrats (SPD) 45,394 .199 .177 0 1
Share Liberals (FDP) 45,394 .013 .035 0 .583
Share Green Party 45,394 .018 .038 0 .375
Share Farleft Parties 45,394 .000 .003 0 .118
Share Farright Parties 45,394 .001 .006 0 .226
Budgetary Characteristics
Administrative Grants pC? 45,394 .076 .133 -.134 8.679
Investment Grants pC? 45,394 .195 .118 -.067 4.316
Credits 45,394 -.001 .069 -.995 .643
Debt pC? 45,394 2.236 .881 .491 6.831
Log Tax Base, Local Business Tax 21,201 5.155 1.889 0 12.863
Infrastructure
Number of Highway Accesses 45,394 .186 .624 0 21
Number of Railway Stations 45,394 .686 1.007 0 13
Number of Airports 45394 .062 .252 0 2
Number of Seaport 45394 .025 .175 0 4
Instrumental Variables
Herfindahl Index, 5-Year Lag 21,288 .105 .110 .002 .853
Avg. Firm Age 21,288 14.238 4.858 0 122
Log Population 1910 21,288 7.514 1.098 4.248 13.359
Log Number of Rail Connections < 1935 21,288 .215 .491 0 4.357
? in thousands of euros. ’Local Business Tax (Perc. Points)’ depicts the local business tax in percentage points.
’Herfindahl Index, Firm Concentration’ stands for the Herfindahl concentration measure defined in Section 3. ’Number
of Employees’ is the number of employees who work in the considered community and are subject to social security
payments. ’Population Share > 65’ and ’Population Share < 15’ indicate the share of a locality’s inhabitants older
than 65 and younger than 15. ’Income pC’ indicates average income at the level of German counties. ’Credits’ depicts
the new credits minus repayment as a share of annual revenues, ’Debt pC’ stands for the total outstanding debt in
per capita terms. This value is obtained at the county level, but it also includes municipality-specific information
on debt of hospitals and other city owned companies like transportation or sewage. ’Investment Grants pC’ and
’Administration Grants pC’ depict investment and administration grants in per capita terms, ’Share Conservative Party
(CDU/CSU)’, ’Share Social Democrats (SPD)’, ’Share Liberals (FDP)’, ’Share Farleft Parties’, ’Share Farright Parties’
indicate the seat shares in the local councils for the respective parties and party groups. Note that the shares do not
23
sum up to one as a significant fraction of local council seats is held by civil parties that are difficult to classify in
the traditional left-right-spectrum. All of the described control variables were obtained from the Federal Statistical
Offices in Germany. The ’Number of Highway Accesses’ moreover indicates a community’s number of highway accesses;
’Number of Railway Stations’, ’Number of Airports’ and ’Number of Seaports’ depict the number of stations, airports
and seaports respectively. The latter information was drawn from the INKAR data provided by the Federal Institute
for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development. We moreover define ’Rural Communities’ following
the classification of the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development. The ’Share
(of) Non-Incorporated Firms’ was drawn from the population of local business tax returns in 2004 aggregated at the
county level for confidentiality reasons. In terms of the instrumental variables, ’Herfindahl Index, 5-Year Lag’ stands
for the 5-year lag of the ’Herfindahl Index, Firm Concentration’-variable defined above. ’Avg. Firm Age’ depicts the
average age of all firms in a locality as determined from the date of incorporation in DAFNE. Finally, ’Log Population
1910’ and ’Log Number of Rail Connections’ stand for the log of the communities’ population in 1910 and the number
of rail connections through the localities before 1935 (see Koh et al. (2013) for details).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Natural Experiment (Section 5)
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Local Business Tax 865 16.658 2.017 10 22.5
Predicted Local Business Tax 865 16.187 1.857 10 22.5
Herfindahl Index (Time Variation: All Mergers) 865 .267 .213 .025 1
Herfindahl Index (Time Variation: Forced Mergers) 865 .307 .206 .033 1
Number of Employees 861 4391.409 13,454.01 18 105,107
Population Share Aged < 15 863 .108 .012 .064 .150
Population Share Aged > 65 863 .231 .031 .151 .314
Spending pC? 865 1.562 .847 .758 7.532
Investment Grants pC? 865 .203 .310 .024 4.179
Other Grants pC? 865 .092 .040 .002 0.379
Seat Share Conservative Party (CDU) 865 .323 .151 0 .692
Seat Share Social Democrats (SPD) 865 .140 .115 0 0.6
Seat Share of Far Left (DIE LINKE) 865 .130 .109 0 0.5
Log Tax Base Local Business Tax 865 5.350 1.723 -2.303 10.050
Notes: ? in thousands of euros. ’Local Business Tax’ depicts the community’s local business tax in percentage points,
’Predicted Local Business Tax’ stands for the local business tax of the respective community in 2005. The variable varies
with forced amalgamations, i.e. corresponds to the population-weighted average local business tax rate of the target
and absorbing community after the amalgamation (calculated based on the 2005 values of the local business tax rates).
’Herfindahl Index (Time Variation: All Mergers)’ stands for the Herfindahl index for the locality’s firm size structure,
calculated based on total asset information from DAFNE for the year 2009. It only varies with forced or voluntary
mergers, capturing changes in the firm size structure induced by the mergers. Analogously, ’Herfindahl Index (Time
Variation: Forced Mergers)’ is the Herfindahl index for the locality’s firm size structure in 2009 and captures changes
in the Herfindahl index induced by forced amalgamations during the second phase of the reform only. ’Number of
Employees’ is the number of employees in the municipality, ’Population Share Aged < 15’ and ’Population Share Aged
> 65’ depict the share of inhabitants aged below 15 or above 65. ’Seat Share Conservative Party (CDU)’, ’Seat Share
Social Democrats (SPD)’ and ’Seat Share of Far Left (DIE LINKE)’ depict the seat share of the conservative party, the
social democrats and the far left (DIE LINKE, formerly PDS) in the local council. ’Spending pC’, ’Investment Grants
pC’ and ’Other Grants pC’ stand for the community’s total spending per capita, investment and other grants per capita
(in thousands of Euro). ’Log Tax Base Local Business Tax’ is the natural logarithm of the local business tax base.
To avoid losing the singular municipality-years where the local business tax base takes on a weakly negative value by
the log-transformation, we replace according observations with a small positive number. Finally note that information
on ’Spending pC’, ’Investment Grants pC’ and ’Other Grants pC’ is available in consistent format up to 2007 only.
The construction of these control variables hence starts from its 2005 values and then varies over time by voluntary
and forced amalgamations (calculated as population-weighted average of the amalgamated localities’ 2005-values in
post-reform years).
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Table 4: Natural Experiment (Section 5) - Dependent Variable: Local Business Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Herfindahl Index -1.013∗∗ -2.750∗∗∗ -2.605∗∗∗ -2.642∗∗∗ -2.560∗∗∗ -3.311∗∗
(0.488) (0.581) (0.584) (0.555) (0.645) (1.416)
Log Employees 0.150∗∗ 0.0391 0.158∗∗ 0.0424 0.0111
(0.0710) (0.0727) (0.0699) (0.0839) (0.102)
Population Share Aged < 15 8.915∗ 9.147∗ 9.032∗ 17.72∗∗∗ 20.69∗∗
(4.802) (4.682) (4.824) (6.721) (8.160)
Population Share Aged > 65 -1.699 0.958 -1.943 2.449 4.390
(2.856) (3.069) (2.827) (4.161) (5.878)
Seat Share Conservative Party 2.002∗∗∗ 2.361∗∗∗ 1.977∗∗∗ 1.729∗∗∗ 1.716∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.337) (0.317) (0.373) (0.409)
Seat Share Social Democcrats 2.013∗∗∗ 2.69s7∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ 2.859∗∗∗ 3.164∗∗∗
(0.555) (0.582) (0.547) (0.717) (0.869)
Seat Share ’DIE LINKE’ 1.884∗∗ 1.911∗∗ 1.908∗∗ 3.032∗∗∗ 3.339∗∗
(0.931) (0.909) (0.933) (1.139) (1.410)
Predicted Local Business Tax 0.456∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.137) (0.128) (0.168) (0.171)
Investment Grants pC 0.101 0.0508 0.114 0.411∗∗ 0.469∗∗
(0.125) (0.128) (0.129) (0.179) (0.203)
Other Grants pC 2.062 1.880 1.826 5.349∗ 6.380∗
(2.256) (2.274) (2.260) (3.250) (3.854)
Spending pC -0.740∗∗ -0.600 -0.728∗ -0.824∗ -0.852∗
(0.376) (0.367) (0.374) (0.444) (0.450)
Any Amalgamation -0.288∗
(since 2006) (0.160)
Any Forced Amalgamation 0.303
(since 2006) (0.301)
Number of Integrated 0.0691∗∗∗
Localities (0.0140)
Log Tax Base Local -0.0301
Business Tax (0.0283)
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Endogenous Regressor All Amalg. All Amalg.
Instrument Forced Amalg. Distance /
Rel. Size
Cragg-Donald Wald 60.314 18.525
F Statistic
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observations 865 861 861 861 861 861
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Notes: See the notes to Table 3 for the variable definition. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. ’OLS’ and ’IV’ stand for ordinary least squares
estimation and instrumental variable strategies respectively. In the ’Endogenous Regressor’ line, ’All Amal.’ indicates
that the Herfindahl index used in the specification as endogenous regressor varies with both, voluntary and forced
amalgamations. In the ’Instrument’ line, ’Forced Amal.’ indicate that the endogenous regressor in the instrumental
variable strategy is instrumented with a Herfindahl index that varies with forced amalgamations only. ’Distance/Rel.
Size’, in turn, is an instrument which models variation in the Herfindahl Index based on assignment rules in the second
forced phase of the reform. Namely, here, the target communities wed during the reform are assigned to the adjacent
community with the closest centroid if they are small (their population amounts to less than 5% of any of the 5 nearest
neighbours). If they are larger, they are assigned to the smallest adjacent locality in terms of population size, reflecting
the aim to create entities of similar size. ’Municipality FE’ and ’Year FE’ indicate that full sets of municipality and
year fixed effects are included in the analysis.
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9 Online Appendix
Table A1 presents coefficient estimates of the control variables in Specifications (1)-
(11) of Table 2 in the main text. In Table A2, we moreover show that the baseline
results are robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across refined regional
units and time. Specifically, Specifications (1)-(4) add a full set of commuting area
year fixed effects to the control variables, Specifications (5)-(8) county fixed effects
and Specifications (9) to (12) county-year fixed effects. This yields results that are
qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to our baseline estimates both, in the full
sample and the subset of communities that host more than 100 plants. Specifications
(1) and (2) of Table A3 moreover allow for a more flexible functional form of the con-
trol variables by adding second-order polynomials of all regressors. Specification (3)
rejects non-linearity in the effect of firm concentration on localities’ local business tax
rate choice. Specifications (4) and (5) augment the set of regressors by interactions
between all control variables and locality size. This again leaves our prior results un-
changed. Specifications (6) and (7) furthermore control for the fraction of economic
activity in multinational enterprises (determined as the share of the locality’s over-
all total assets in multinational firms, calculated from DAFNE30) to account for the
fact that multinational status may go hand in hand with tax avoidance opportunities
(and international mobility) that may put pressure on communities’ business tax rates
and may correlate with firm size. In line with expectations, the results suggest that
municipalities with a high fraction of multinational activity set lower tax rates than
municipalities with a more domestic asset base. The baseline estimates for the firm
concentration index are, in turn, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively affected.
Specifications (1) and (2) of Table A4 moreover control for the industry structure of
the localities by adding a full set of industry controls that capture the share of the
communities’ total assets for each 2-digit NACE industry, as determined by DAFNE.
Specifications (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) moreover control for agglomeration rents at the in-
dustry level (’Index Industry Agglomeration Rents’), as proxied by an agglomeration
index drawn from prior work (Koh et al. (2013), Log Lo2i,t defined therein). The coef-
ficient estimates for the Herfindahl index for firm concentration remain unchanged in
all model specifications, suggesting that our results are not driven by unobserved het-
erogeneity in industry structures. To control for inter-jurisdictional tax competition,
30Note that we rely on total asset shares instead of number of employees as the coverage of the
latter variable is rather poor. Firms are moreover defined to belong to multinational entities if either
the global ultimate owner is non-German or if the entity owns directly or indirectly (via other entities
in the same group) foreign subsidiaries.
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Specifications (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) furthermore add the distance-weighted average of
neighbouring jurisdictions’ local business tax rate to the set of regressors. Specification
(11) reestimate the instrumental variable model presented in Column (4) of Table 2
in the main text, where ’Index Industry Agglomeration Rents’ and ’Neighbor Local
Business Tax’ are added as regressors and instrumented with the distance weighted
size average of neighbouring localities and the long-lagged number of railway connec-
tions (see also Section 4.2). Again, the coefficient estimates for the firm concentration
variable largely resemble our baseline estimates. Specification (12) finally drops the
restriction of the sample to localities with more than 10 plants. In line with the in-
tuition spelled out in the main text, the coefficient estimate for the Herfindahl index
turns out smaller than in the baseline model, albeit still statistically significant.
Table A5 acknowledges that a significant number of localities do not change their local
business tax at all within our sample frame and hence present results of logit models
that assess whether firm size structures impact on the binary decision to raise or lower
the business tax. Similar to the baseline findings, the results in Specification (6) and (8)
suggest that an increase in the Herfindahl index by 0.1 lowers (increases) a community’s
propensity to raise (reduce) its local business tax rate by 0.9 (0.4) percentage points or,
evaluated at the sample mean, by 10.7% (26.5%).31 The results in Table A6 moreover
show that the significance of the firm concentration effect on local business tax choices
prevails when we account for clustering of errors at larger geographic units (at the
commuting area, commuting area-year and state-year-level).
Table A7 presents results of dynamic panel models with municipality fixed effects.
To avoid Nickell bias, we follow Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and estimate the model
in first-differences, where the lagged dependent variable is instrumented with deeper
lags. Specification (1) presents results for the full sample, Specification (2) results for
localities that host more than 100 plants and Specification (3) results for localities with
more than 250 plants and a right wing majority in the local council. While the point
estimates in all three specifications are similar to the baseline estimates, standard errors
are inflated and the estimates are less precise, reflecting limited time variation in the
concentration variable, where the between component of the standard deviation is 0.11,
while the within-deviation amounts to 0.02 only. Note that the coefficient estimate for
the firm concentration variable gains statistical significance at conventional significance
levels in Specification (3).
Specifications (1) to (6) of Table A8 moreover assess the sensitivity of our results to us-
31Note that the average propensity to raise and decrease the local business tax rate is 8.7% and
1.7% respectively in Specifications (6) and (8).
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ing alternative measures for communities’ firm size structure, namely the standard devi-
ation of the firm size distribution (Sit =
√
1
K
∑K
k=1(EMPikt − EMPit)2, where EMPit
depicts the average plant employment in community i at time t (EMPit =
∑
k EMPikt
K
)
(following Bombardini (2008))) and the employment share of the largest firm, as con-
structed from DAFNE (Mit = maxEMPikt/
∑
k EMPikt). Specifications (1) and (2)
moreover rerun the baseline model with a Herfindahl index calculated from DAFNE. In
line with previous findings, the coefficient estimates turn out negative and statistically
significant in all specifications. Note that the quantitative effects are also comparable
to the baseline findings, suggesting that an increase of the Herfindahl index/standard
deviation/maximum employment share by one standard deviation lowers the local busi-
ness tax rate by 1.2%/2.6%/1.1% (cf. Specifications (1), (3) and (5)).32
Finally, we ran quantile regressions. While OLS regression approximates the condi-
tional mean of the outcome variable distribution, quantile regression models the qth
quantile of the outcome distribution as a function of explanatory variables. Specifically,
while the OLS regression coefficients are defined as
αˆ = arg min
α
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
(bi,r,t − α1 − α2Hi,r,t − α′3Xi,r,t)2,
the qth quantile regression estimator αˆq can be obtained as
αˆq = arg min
αq
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
cq(bi,r,t − α1 − α2Hi,r,t − α′3Xi,r,t),
with
cq(ui,r,t) =
(
q1(ui,r,t ≥ 0) + (1− q)1(ui,r,t ≤ 0)
)|ui,r,t|.
The main benefit of quantile regressions is that they are robust to outliers and provide a
more complete picture of the relationship between firm concentration and local business
tax choices. The results are presented in Table A9. The upper panel presents results
for the full set of localities and suggest that lower conditional quantiles of the business
tax distribution tend to react more sensitively to differences in the firm size structure
than upper conditional quantiles of the business tax distribution. Interestingly, this
pattern is less pronounced if the sample is restricted to larger localities which host
more than 100 plants (see the results presented in the lower panel of Table A9).
32Note that the average local business tax rate in the respective models is 17.0%, and one stan-
dard deviation in the Herfindahl index/standard deviation/maximum employment share amounts to
0.22/6.32/0.23. In the long run, it hence follows that an increase in the Herfindahl index by one
standard deviation lowers the local business tax rate by 0.2 percentage points, as calculated from
= −0.027 · 0.22/(1− 0.97) or, evaluated at the sample mean, by 1.2%.
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Table A3 - Robustness Checks II: Flexible Form of Controls and Share MNEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Local Business Tax, Lag 0.944∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Herfindahl Index -0.045∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.046) (0.099) (0.017) (0.046) (0.017) (0.046)
Herfindahl Index, Squared 0.185
(0.269)
Share Multinationals -0.068∗ -0.240∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.088)
Firm Number > 10 > 100 > 100 > 10 > 100 > 10 > 100
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction Controls & Size Yes Yes
Commuting Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40,227 17,317 17,317 40,227 17,317 40,227 17,317
R-squared 0.961 0.972 0.972 0.961 0.972 0.960 0.972
Notes: Dependent variable: local business tax rate. Specifications (1) to (5) include the full set of control variables
described in Sections 3 and 4, with first and second order polynomials. Specifications (4) and (5) furthermore include in-
teraction terms of all control variables with locality size. ∗∗∗, ∗∗and ∗indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table Appendix A5 - Robustness Checks IV: Binary Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Incr. Incr. Decr. Decr. Incr. Incr. Decr. Decr.
Local Business -0.035*** 0.024*** -0.033*** 0.020***
Tax, Lag (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Herfindahl Index -0.235 -0.399* 2.092*** 2.403*** -0.544 -1.305** 1.889** 3.003***
(0.174) (0.208) (0.467) (0.529) (0.509) (0.632) (0.894) (1.118)
Firm Number > 10 > 10 > 10 > 10 > 100 > 100 > 100 > 100
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comm. Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Binary dependent variables, indicating tax increases (’Incr.’) and tax decreases (’Decr.’). All specifications
include the full set of control variables described in Sections 3 and 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗and ∗indicates significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
Table Appendix A6 - Robustness Checks V: Clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Business 0.945∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗
Tax, Lag (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Herfindahl Index -0.045∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.039) (0.048) (0.041)
Clustering Commuting Commuting State Commuting Commuting State
Area Area Year Year Area Area Year Year
Firm Number > 10 > 10 > 10 > 100 > 100 > 100
Commuting Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40,227 40,227 40,227 17,317 17,317 17,317
R-squared 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.972 0.972 0.972
Notes: Dependent variable: local business tax rate. All specifications include the full set of control variables described
in Sections 3 and 4. The specifications moreover account for clustering of errors at the commuting-area level, the
commuting-area-year level and state-year level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗and ∗indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table Appendix A7 - Robustness Checks VI: Municipality Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Local Business Tax Rate, Lag 0.636∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.080) (0.215)
Herfindahl Index -0.063 -0.457 -3.586∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.542) (1.351)
Firm Number > 10 > 100 > 250
Right-Wing
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,071 12,435 2,233
Notes: Dependent variable: local business tax rate. All specifications include the full set of control variables described
in Sections 3 and 4. Equation estimated in first differences. Lagged dependent variable is instrumented following An-
derson and Hsiao (1982) with deeper, namely the second and third lag of the dependent variable. ∗∗∗, ∗∗and ∗indicates
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table Appendix A8 - Robustness Checks VII: Other Concentration Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Business Tax, Lag 0.971∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Herfindahl Index (DAFNE) -0.027∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.014) (0.028)
Standard Deviation (DAFNE) -0.002∗∗ -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Employment Share Largest Firm -0.023∗ -0.045∗∗
(DAFNE) (0.013) (0.023)
Firm Number > 10 > 100 > 10 > 100 > 10 > 100
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comm. Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,643 4,926 11,466 4,915 11,643 4,926
R-squared 0.973 0.983 0.973 0.983 0.973 0.983
Notes: Dependent variable: local business tax rate. All specifications include the full set of control variables described
in Sections 3 and 4. Firm concentration measures for our sample localities are calculated from DAFNE (the Herfindahl
index in Specifications (1) and (2), the standard deviation of the firm size distribution as determined by total assets in
Specifications (3) and (4) and the employment share of the largest firm in the locality in Specifications (5) and (6)).
∗∗∗, ∗∗and ∗indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table A9 - Robustness Check VIII: Quantile Regression
Quantiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Firm Number >10 - Baseline
Herfindahl Index -.345∗∗∗ -.180∗∗∗ -.159∗∗∗ -.037 .112
(.068) (.036) (.040) (.045) (.089)
Firm Number >100
Herfindahl Index -1.765∗∗∗ -1.188∗∗∗ -1.014∗∗∗ -.953∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗∗
(.277) (.133) (.213) (.130) (.177)
Community Controls Yes
State FE Yes
Commuting Area FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: local business tax rate. All specifications include the full set of control variables described
in Sections 3 and 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗and ∗indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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